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1. Introduction 
Are good firms good for investors? Even if most academics are sceptical, there is evidence that the 
investing public at large think so (see, for example, Barber and Odean, 2002). At least once a year, almost 
every  newspaper  and  financial  magazine  includes  a  set  of  stock  selection  tips  for  private  investors. 
Similarly, one of the core functions of stock analysts is to provide an assessment for institutional clients of 
the inherent worth of firms and whether the stock of those firms is likely to rise in value over the medium 
to longer term. However, one may argue that there is likely to be little information content in stock 
suggestions put forward by uninformed private individuals1. There is also now a large literature suggesting 
that analyst recommendations are overly optimistic (Hong and Kubic, 2003), although they still appear 
useful2.  
 
The concept of a firm’s reputation has been defined in various ways, but it may usefully be defined as a 
perceptual representation of a company’s past actions and future prospects that describe its overall appeal 
to all its key constituents when compared to other leading rivals” (Fombrun, 1996, p.72). Traditional 
financial theories related to the notion of efficient markets suggest that a firm’s current or past reputation 
should not provide any useful guide as to its future stock price performance. Therefore, after allowing for 
factors such as the industry in which the firm operates, its risk, and its size, firms with strong reputations 
relative  to  competitors  should  not  earn  abnormal  returns.  There  may  be  stock  price  movements  in 
response to unexpected changes in reputation, but these should be unpredictable, one-off shifts.  
 
By contrast, many financial analysts, market pundits and academic studies, suggest that a firm’s reputation 
will have a positive impact on changes in its future share price. This would be the case if those with 
specialist knowledge of particular firms or industries could appreciate firms’ worth more quickly than 
outsiders, so that a favoured firm’s stock price will appreciate over the period until this fact becomes 
                                                       
1 For example, there are now several studies that examine the usefulness of the information posted on internet news bulletin 
boards for developing trading rules, including Dewally (2003).  
2 See, for example, Barber et al. (2001) for a recent study. They show that buying a portfolio of analyst most highly recommended 
stocks and short selling the least recommended stocks generates returns of 75 to 100 basis points per month. Similarly, Womack 
(1996) provides evidence of positive short-run abnormal returns for securities newly added to analysts’ buy recommendations, 
and negative abnormal returns for new sell indicators.  ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-05 
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apparent  to  the  investing public  at  large.  Such  a  philosophy  lies  behind  Warren  Buffett’s  apparently 
phenomenally successful investment approach (see Buffett and Clark, 2002), which involves seeking out 
“excellent businesses” that are undervalued and holding them for the long run.  
 
Finally, it may be possible that firms with strong reputations earn negative abnormal returns since the 
euphoria surrounding them has caused investors to be willing to pay too much. Eventually, the firm’s 
operating performance will not be able to deliver the promise, causing a reversal in its share price. There is 
widespread international evidence of over-reactions in stock markets, whereby firms whose stock prices 
have appreciated the most over a one to five year historical period have a tendency to underperform 
subsequently (see, for example, DeBondt and Thaler, 1985, 1987; Clare and Thomas, 1995; Chen and 
DeBondt,  2004).  Such  over-reaction  and  subsequent  reversals  of  fortunes  are  hard  to  explain  using 
rational pricing approaches, and have encouraged a renewed interest in behavioural models.  
 
This  study  is  among  the  first  to  employ  UK  data  from  Management  Today’s  annual  “Most  Admired 
Companies” survey and to consider both the market impact and profitability of the information contained 
within it. It offers two distinctive contributions. First, we inspect for an impact on not only long-run 
returns, but also effects on or around the date of announcement, i.e. the date on which the reputation 
scores are published in Management Today. Second, we also consider the impact on stock returns of changes 
in the position a firm achieves in the published ranking according to reputation scores rather than the 
scores per se. We do so to allow for the possibility that the informational impact of the index resides in 
the extent to which a firm’s rating differs from that most recently published, rather than the score itself. 
This is an important innovation since, following the standard arguments put forward by proponents of the 
efficient markets hypothesis (EMH), only new information should yield a market impact. Arguably, if a 
company has a particular score in one Management Today survey and obtains a similar score in the following 
survey, no new information has been revealed. We investigate the stock returns of portfolios comprising 
all of the firms with scores, and comprising only firms with large changes in scores, to determine whether 
such intuition applies in this context.  
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Our  research  provides  a  useful  comparison  for  previous  work  that  almost  exclusively  considers  US 
surveys.  Our  dataset  includes  reputation  scores  for  the  whole  ten-year  period  from  1994-2003.  To 
anticipate our findings, we observe that there appears to be a small positive anticipation effect on the day 
before the survey is published, but very little price impact around the time when the new scores are 
announced or thereafter. We then examine the impacts of firm-specific characteristics such as industrial 
classification, capitalisation, market risk, price-to-book and momentum. We conclude that highly rated 
firms  still  yield  abnormal  profits  over  the  year  after  survey  publication  if  a  standard  market  index 
benchmark is employed, but when the industry characteristics are accounted for, the highly rated firms 
provide a disappointing performance.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 examines related literatures on the impact 
of corporate reputation and social responsibility on firm value. Section 3 describes and summarises the 
Management Today survey and explains our sources of other data. Section 4 describes the methodologies 
used for examining the financial impact and utility of the Management Today announcements, while Section 
5 discusses the results and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Corporate Reputation and Stock Returns 
There is a significant body of research relating corporate reputation to firm profitability, but some of these 
studies are based on firms’ operating performance (e.g., McGuire et al., 1988), rather than stock returns, 
which  are  the  focus  of  the  present  study.  The  impact  of  reputation  on  operating  performance  and 
corporate earnings are arguably only of indirect interest to investors through their effect on current or 
projected future returns. Only a small number of existing studies relate corporate reputation to stock 
returns, and most are popular books lacking in rigorous research – for example, Clayman (1987) and 
Siegel (1995), both of which find that their samples of highly regarded stocks outperform the market 
during the periods they investigated.  
 
A notable exception is a recent study by Agarwal et al. (2005), which employs a panel of Management Today’s 
annual “Most Admired Companies” reputation index drawn across a similar time period to that employed ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-05 
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in our study. They focus upon both long-run stock returns and levels of, rather than year-on-year changes 
in,  reputation  to  investigate  whether,  in  the  year  following  each  annual  publication,  the  stocks  of 
companies thus identified as highly regarded tend to subsequently outperform those of the least admired 
firms. Their findings indicate that high reputation scores are not associated with superior ex post stock 
returns, but rather superior ex ante stock returns, implying that reputational assessments are biased by prior 
share performance.  
 
In a loosely related study, Antunovich and Laster (2000) employ data for the 1983-1996 period from the 
US survey conducted each year by Fortune magazine in producing its list of “America’s Most Admired 
Companies”. Sorting the sample by scores into deciles, they find that the stocks of the most admired firms 
decile yield positive abnormal returns of 3.2% in the following year and 8.3% over the following three 
years. The stocks of the decile of lowest-scoring firms yield negative abnormal returns of 8.6% in the 
following nine months, although there is a sharp reversal thereafter. Chung et al. (1999), on the other 
hand, find little evidence that highly rated firms outperform less admired firms on a risk-adjusted basis. 
They employ data for the slightly shorter 1990-98 period, but they examine the performance of only the 
very highest ranked 10 firms and the very lowest ranked 10 firms, rather than the 50-firm portfolios 
employed by Antunovich and Laster (2000). Therefore, the results of Chung et al. (1999) could have arisen 
as a result of significant idiosyncratic risk in their portfolios.  
  
Our study is also related to a broad spectrum of work that seeks to investigate the impacts upon stock 
returns of the reputation, variously defined and measured, of top management teams (Chemmanur and 
Paeglis,  2005;  D’Aveni,  1990),  CEOs  in  particular  (Wade  et  al.,  2006;  Malmendier  and  Tate,  2005; 
Milbourn, 2003), and underwriters (Carter et al., 1998). Some such studies derive their reputation measures 
from the results of magazine tournaments (e.g. “CEO of the Year” by Financial World magazine), while 
others  use  prestige  indicators  (e.g.  educational  background  and  notable  institutional  affiliations). 
Somewhat unsurprisingly given the differing measures and analytical tools employed, the findings are 
somewhat mixed, but there is broad support for an influence of reputations on stock market behaviour. In 
a similar vein, some studies have investigated the impact on stock returns of the information contained ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-05 
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within equity analyst’s reports (Asquith et al., 2005; Barber et al., 2001). These studies provide evidence in 
support of an influence attributable to analyst’s opinions, such that there is a positive impact on the 
market valuations of favoured stocks – perhaps keenly relevant for our study, as the Management Today 
index draws upon a survey of analysts as well as industry peers. 
 
Although only one of the indicators that make up the reputation scores focuses on corporate social 
responsibility,  “community  and  environmental  responsibility”,  our  research  is  loosely  related  to  the 
growing body of literature in this area. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has been defined as “a 
concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and 
in their interaction with stakeholders on a voluntary basis” (European Commission, 2001). Research has 
suggested that reputation and corporate social responsibility CSR may be positively related, while noting 
that CSR is multi-faceted (e.g. philanthropic giving, reducing negative environmental externalities, fair 
working  practices,  etc.).  Therefore,  the  various  aspects  of  CSR  may  have  differential  impacts  on 
stakeholder perceptions of the firm, depending also on the industry in which the firm operates (see 
Brammer and Pavelin, 2006). Having a social conscience may enhance a firm’s reputation by helping to 
satisfy stakeholders (employees, altruistic shareholders, consumers, government). There is also evidence 
that awareness and consideration of environmental and employee issues may reduce the potential for 
costly law suits (Ullmann, 1985) and enhance worker productivity (Turban and Greening, 1997). Cox et al. 
(2004) and Graves and Waddock (1994) suggest, using UK and US data respectively, that poor corporate 
social performance leads to a reduction in the number of long-term institutional investors holding the 
firm’s stock since such firms are likely to be “screened out”. On the other hand, a view dating back to 
Rostow (1959), and Friedman (1970), and echoed by a number of other more recent studies, is that CSR 
may divert resources away from projects that would have had a greater impact on reputation or directly on 
profitability (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). Rostow (1959, p.63) terms CSR “bewildering balderdash” 
while Johnson (1966, p.394) suggests that it is at best “a public relations camouflage for sophisticated 
pursuit of profits.”  
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The conclusions of research into the impact of CSR on firm value have been mixed, and the majority of 
studies that have examined the relationship between social performance and stock returns have focused 
on socially responsible funds rather than individual stocks. The use of such data renders it difficult to 
determine whether fund performance is a result of the good or bad performance of socially responsible 
versus socially irresponsible stocks or a result of the abilities of the managers of ethical funds. Among 
studies at the individual company level, Filbeck and Preece (2003) examine the information content of 
Fortune’s annual “best 100 companies to work for in America” survey results, using data for the period 
1987-1999. This award considers the “work/family balance”, as well as remuneration and a range of other 
issues. Both immediate price reactions on announcement of the contents of the list and long-term buy-
and-hold abnormal returns are examined. The average market-adjusted abnormal return on the event day 
is a highly significant 4%, while the average abnormal return for the following year is 11.8%. A sample of 
non-award winning firms, matched on size and sector, is significantly outperformed by the award-winners 
for 2 of the 13 years (30-day event period), and for 8 of them over the one-year horizon. The positive 
results in this study are argued to be stronger than previous findings in large part because Fortune has such 
a wide readership. 
 
3. Data 
3.1 The Management Today Corporate Reputation Survey 
Management Today annually produces a list of “Britain’s most admired companies”.  The methodology that 
they use is similar to that employed by Fortune in constructing their “Most Admired Companies” list, a 
commonly used measure of the reputations of US firms (see, for example, Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; 
Fombrun, 1996; Fryxell and Wang, 1994; McGuire el al., 1988). The chairpersons, managing directors, and 
selected main board directors of the 10 largest companies in around 24 industrial sectors are surveyed 
annually together with a sample of analysts at leading investment management firms. Typically, 70% of the 
companies and 90% of the analysts that are approached respond to the survey. The number of sectors 
varies from one year to another (for example, there were 22 in 2003 but 24 in 2002). In 2003, the sectors 
were: banking; building materials and merchants; chemicals; construction; engineering – aero and defence; 
food producers and processors; food retailing; health and household; insurance; leisure; entertainment and ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-05 
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hotels; media; oil, gas and extractive; property; restaurants, pubs and breweries; retailers – textiles and 
apparel; retailers – general; software and computer services; speciality and other finance; support services; 
telecommunications; transport; utilities.   
 
Survey participants are asked to rate each company in their sector (excluding their own company) on a 
scale of 0 (poor) to 10 (excellent) for their performance in a range of 9 indicators: quality of management; 
financial soundness; ability to attract, develop and retain top talent; quality of products/services; value as a 
long  term  investment;  capacity  to  innovate;  quality  of  marketing;  community  and  environmental 
responsibility; use of corporate assets. The assessments received for each firm are averaged across criteria 
and respondents to produce a single reputation score.  
 
The survey results are presented annually in the December edition of Management Today, and we have ten 
years of reputation scores beginning in 1994 and ending in 2003. It would be of interest to examine the 
determinants of the reputation scores, and although this is not the subject of the present study, we briefly 
examine the financial characteristics of the firms that score highly in Section 3.4. In that connection, factor 
analysis of the Fortune reputation index carried out by Fryxell and Wang (1994) indicates that despite the 
fact that the overall reputation score is derived from multiple components, it largely reflects a single 
assessment of the firm. Specifically, they find all elements, apart from ‘Community and environmental 
responsibility’, to be driven by a single factor, closely related to financial success. Consequently, they 
conclude that reputation scores gleaned from these surveys capture the manner in which each firm is 
perceived as an investment prospect.3 While this study relates to the Fortune rather than Management Today 
index, the close similarity in survey methods employed ensures that, in the absence of a similar analysis of 
the latter, it provides a good guide to that which is reflected by the reputation scores for UK companies. 
Indeed, there is some evidence that similar analyses of the Fortune and Management Today indices tend to 
                                                       
3 This feature of the reputation scores is perhaps unsurprising given that market analysts, as well as industry peers, are surveyed. 
In order to more directly capture the opinions of analysts one could investigate the impacts of their reports rather than the 
reputation indices of Fortune or Management Today. However, the  stock return implications of analyst recommendations have 
already been exhaustively studied in the extant literature. Moreover, it is reasonable, given the different contexts in which the 
information is provided, to expect that the impacts of the latter might differ systematically from those of former. For informative 
recent analyses that employ the former, see Asquith et al. (2005) and Barber et al. (2001). ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-05 
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yield reassuringly similar results (for example, comparable studies by Fombrun and Shanley (1990) and 
Brammer and Pavelin (2006)). 
 
3.2 Other Variables 
Our sample comprises all firms that were constituents of the FTSE All Share Index over the 10-year 
period from 1994 – 2003. This index is a market-capitalisation weighted index of UK quoted firms. We 
obtained data from Datastream on all firms that were index constituents at any time during the sample 
period for the following variables: share total return indices (i.e. with dividends added back), market value 
of equity, book value, and industry code). After excluding investment trusts, and companies for which 
either the Datastream codes or one of the required variables was missing, we were left with a total of 451 
firms plus the All Share Index itself.  
 
3.3 Summary Statistics for Reputations Data 
Although the number of firms that have received a score in the survey varies from one year to another, 
typically around 180-200 of our firms has a reputation score. The mean score is 55 with standard deviation 
6.6. Thus the spread of scores is narrow, and most rated firms receive a score in the 55-65 range. It is 
interesting to examine the firms that received the very highest scores, and to this end, the top 5 firms by 
score  in  each  year  are  presented  in  Table  1.  All  of  the  firms  are  household  names  and  they  are 
concentrated among retail, oil, pharmaceutical and food and drink companies. Given that good firms are 
unlikely to turn bad over night, one observes the expected strong degree of persistency in the profiles, 
with many firms being highly admired for several years in a row. Smithkline Beecham (which after a 
merger with Glaxo Welcome became known as Glaxo Smithkline) appeared in the top 5 in 1994 and then 
again every year from 1997 to 2003. Tesco appeared in the top 5 every year from 1995 and was the single 
most admired firm for 4 of our 10 sample years. The table also reveals a remarkable degree of similarity in 
the scores awarded to top firms through time. There is a great deal of persistence in the score given to 
each firm, and the average correlation between a given firm’s score in one year and its score in the next is 
65%. If a firm receives a score that places it within the top 100 ranked firms in a particular year, there is a 
93% probability (assuming that the firm continues to exist) that it will still be in the top 100 the following ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-05 
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year. Therefore, we suggest that neither the score nor the fact that a firm appears within the top 100 firms 
by reputation will constitute particularly useful information for investors, since the marginal news value 
will be relatively small. Instead, it seems plausible that investors will focus on the change in score and/or 
the change in ranking of firms, especially if the change is large. We thus investigate a number of ways of 
categorising the information contained in the survey results, including an examination of: 1) whether the 
firm’s reputation ranks it within the top 100, top 50 or top 10 firms; 2) whether a firm’s reputations score 
rank has risen or fallen compared to the previous year; 3) whether the firm’s ranking has risen or fallen by 
more than 50 places. 
 
Changes in score are typically fairly small and are negatively correlated over time (correlation: -0.2). That 
is, firms whose scores rise one year will on average experience falls the following year and vice versa. 
However, there are one or two spectacular rises and falls from grace. Schroders score fell from 71.2 in 
1998 52.2 in 1999, a fall of 19 percentage points. Their reputation ranking fell from 3rd to 119th, a fall of 
over 100 places in a single year. Similarly, Anglia Water (AWG) fell from 55.5 in 2001 to 37.4 in 2002, a 
fall of 18.1 percentage points. By contrast, Compass’ score rose from 50.3 in 2002 to 65.5 in 2003, a rise 
of over 15 percentage points.  
 
3.4 Which Financial Characteristics Lead to High Reputation Scores? 
Brammer and Pavelin (2006) suggest that the Management Today reputation scores are related to social 
performance, financial performance, market risk, the degree of institutional shareholding, and the nature 
of the firm’s business activities. It is of interest to examine the financial characteristics of firms that score 
highly, but, since this is not the main focus of our study, we will consider only the financial variables that 
are employed in other parts of our paper. To this end, we regress the pooled sample of company scores 
for all years (a total of 1525 observations) on a constant, the company’s price-to-book value, its capital 
asset  pricing  model  beta4,  market  capitalisation,  and  the  previous  year’s  stock  return.  Separately,  we 
calculate the average score for each industrial classification. The results from the regression and for the 
average scores for each sector are presented in Panels A and B respectively of Table 2.  
                                                       
4 Stock betas for each year are formed on the basis of the past 5 years of monthly data up to 1 December. ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-05 
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As Panel A shows, from among the variables that we consider, survey respondents appear to rate highly 
those firms whose stocks experienced the largest price appreciations during the previous year. While the 
previous year’s return parameter is highly statistically significant (p-value 0.000), it is economically small. 
Thus  a  10%  increase  in  return  will  lead  to  an  average  increase  in  the  score  of  0.3  points.  Market 
capitalisation is also highly significant and has a positive sign, indicating that survey respondents rate large 
companies more highly, everything else equal. Both price-to-book and beta have their expected positive 
and negative signs respectively, indicating that “growth” stocks and those with relatively low risks, will 
yield  higher  scores  on  average.  These  results  using  the  UK  Management  Today  survey  responses  and 
indicating that admired firms are typically large, “glamour” stocks corroborate the findings of Shefrin and 
Statman (1995, 1997) and Chung et al. (1999) that used US Fortune survey data. 
 
Panel B of Table 2 indicates a remarkable degree of similarity in the average scores by sector classification. 
While  stocks  in  the  non-cyclical  consumer,  industrials,  resources  and  non-cyclical  services  sectors 
generated slightly higher scores than other sectors, all sectors bar one have average scores in the range (52, 
57). It is only unquoted companies that yield considerably lower scores than all other sectors (average 
unquoted company score: 47.8), indicating that survey respondents prefer companies that are listed and 
that are likely therefore to be more familiar to them. Quoted firms are also likely to be larger and to have 
lower betas, corroborating our previous finding.  
 
4. Methodology 
Our analysis of the impact and financial usefulness of the reputations scores announced by Management 
Today is conducted in two parts, following Filbeck and Preece (2003). The first part examines the market 
impact of the announcements over a 21-day window surrounding the 1 December date that Management 
Today  is  published  each  year.  Second,  we  also  consider  whether  there  is  any  information  in  the 
announcements that can be usefully employed to earn abnormal profits in the longer run. The techniques 
employed to examine the post-announcement impacts over both horizons are described in the following 
sections.  ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-05 
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4.1 Short-run Price Impacts 
We determine the price impact of new survey announcements using a standard event study approach 
where we consider a 21-day window around 1 December of each year. 1 December (or the next working 
day thereafter if 1 December is at the weekend during a particular year) is defined as day t, and we 
consider the abnormal returns (relative to the FTSE All-Share) on days t-10 to t-1 (to determine whether 
there could be any anticipation or leakage of information contained in the survey results) and then on days 
t+1 to t+10 (to determine whether there is any lagged impact or slow incorporation of any information 
contained in the survey data). We compute both abnormal returns on each day within the event window, 
and the cumulative returns from day t-10 to day t-1, and from day t+1 to t+10. 
 
4.2. Long Run Profitability of Trading on Information in Most Admired Companies Survey 
We determine the profitability of trading in Most Admired Companies by forming various portfolios on 1 
December (or the next working day if 1 December falls on a weekend), the day of publication of the 
survey, and holding them until 31 November (or the last working day before if 31 falls on a weekend). We 
assume that equally weighted portfolios are formed in each case. Our performance figures do not allow 
for transactions costs, although these are likely to be relatively trivial since trading would occur only once 
a year and all of the companies with reputations scores are large.  
 
It is important to allow for firm characteristics when examining the performance of the most admired 
firms, since highly admired firms were found typically to be large, glamour stocks. As Antunovich and 
Laster (2000) point out, the Fama-French (1992) study and associated work has suggested that such firms 
are likely on average to perform poorly. Thus, we wish to examine the impact of firm characteristics on 
the  profitability  of  the  various  one-year  holding  strategies  described  above.  So,  suppose  we  observe 
companies that have scores ranking them reputationally in the top 10 yield large abnormal returns. Is this 
exceptional performance a feature of new information that was not already available in standard firm 
characteristics? Or does it arise, for example, because such firms have large exposures to a momentum 
factor and stocks with momentum usually outperform in the following year? In order to answer this 
question, we run the following regression using a pooled sample comprising all available years: ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-05 
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  rit = β1 + β2BETAi,t +β3PTBVi,t +β4CAPi,t +β5rit-1 + ut      (2) 
where  rit  are  the  returns  to  stock  i  in  year  t  (where  each  year  runs  from  1  December),  and  ut  is  a 
disturbance term. We therefore regress the annual returns on a constant, size (“CAP”), price-to-book 
(“PTBV”), beta, and the previous year’s return. These explanatory variables are the Fama-French factors, 
plus a measure of momentum. The latter is employed following work by Carhart (1997), which suggests 
that firms experiencing strong performance over periods up to one year are likely to continue to do so in 
the short term. The regression is run on all firms excluding those under consideration. So if, for example, 
we are investigating the abnormal performance of firms whose reputation scores place them in the top 
100, the regression would be performed using data on all firms excluding those in the top 100. The 
estimated  regression  parameters  will  show  the  relationship  between  average  returns  for  non-top  100 
stocks and their characteristics. We then take these parameter values and multiply them by the equally 
weighted average values of the characteristics (i.e. beta, PTBV, cap, previous return) for companies that 
are in the top 100. This enables us to answer the question, “given the average characteristics of the 
companies in the top 100, what returns would have been expected based on the relationship between 
characteristics and returns for firms that were not in the top 100?” This approach is repeated separately to 
determine the expected returns for 1) stocks with a reputation score; 2) stocks with ranks in the top 100; 
3) stocks whose reputational ranks rose by at least 50 places in a single year.  
 
Our regression-based  approach  is somewhat  different  to the Barber,  Lyon  and Tsai (1998)  “sample-
matching” procedure employed by Antunovich and Laster (2000). The latter method would involve multi-
way sorting the control sample of firms into quintiles or deciles based on the various characteristics, which 
may still leave the sorted portfolio with somewhat different characteristics to the firm it is supposedly 
matched with. By contrast, our technique should ensure that the expected return for a firm with these 
characteristics is calculated exactly. From a practical perspective, it would be infeasible in our case to 
perform a multi-dimensional sort given the smaller number of companies available for analysis in the UK, 
since to do so would lead to some almost empty cells, where the control portfolios contained very small 
numbers of stocks or no stocks.  
 ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-05 
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5. Results 
5.1 Short-run Price Impact 
Table 3 presents percentage returns for each of the ten days before and after the announcement of the 
survey results on 1 December, for companies whose ranks rose compared with the previous year5. Some 
anticipation of the survey results seems to be evident, with positive returns on day t-1 for 7 of the 9 years 
in the sample. In spite of this, returns over the whole run-up period from 10 days before announcement 
are negative for 6 of 9 years and are negative on average. Returns are highly variable on publication day, 
and the average returns on all days are extremely small in the announcement interval for all years. Thus, 
even if some are statistically significant, they are not of a financially meaningful magnitude. The average 
return on the publication date (1 December or the first trading day thereafter) is positive about half the 
time, and no consistent patterns of returns are apparent on the following days to t+10. Thus, there appear 
to be no exploitable profit opportunities around the survey announcement date. While Table 3 displays 
raw rather than abnormal returns, use of the latter did not qualitatively alter our conclusions.  
 
Table 3 shows average returns only for companies whose ranks have risen. Figures 1 and 2 present a fuller 
analysis  by  plotting  the  daily  returns  and  the  cumulative  returns  from  day  t-10  respectively  for:  1) 
companies in the top 100 by score, 2) companies whose ranks have risen compared with the previous 
year’s survey, 3) companies whose ranks have fallen, 4) companies whose ranks have risen by more than 
50  places,  5)  companies  whose  ranks  have  fallen  by  more  than  50  places.  The  latter  two  represent 
situations where the reputational perception of the firm has changed considerably compared with the 
previous year, and we would expect stronger price responses in such cases than when relatively minor 
changes in score (and therefore rank) have occurred6. The ranks are indicative that whether firms’ ranks in 
the surveys rise or fall compared with the previous year, returns are always positive on day t-1, although 
they are higher for firms whose ranks rise. The average day t-1 return corresponds to an annualised figure 
of a little over 40%. Our results suggest that the publicity associated with being in a company having a 
score outweighs any negative impact of a fall in ranking compared with the previous year. Cumulative 
                                                       
5 Returns around the announcement for companies whose ranks fell, or for companies that appeared in the Top 100, or that 
experienced extreme changes in their scores, are considered subsequently in Figures 1 and 2. 
6 Although the choice of a 50 rank place change cutoff to determine whether reputation has changed significantly is somewhat 
arbitrary, we find that the main results are not altered by fairly large changes in this parameter (i.e. 20 to 80). ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-05 
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returns  for  (t-10,  t+10)  are  negative  whether  the  company  rank  has  risen  or  fallen,  although  not 
significantly so, perhaps resulting from general seasonalities in the market. When a firm experiences a fall 
in its reputational rank, especially if it falls a great deal, this leads to lower cumulative returns (i.e. larger 
price falls), although when the firm’s rank rises, the extent of the increase appears largely irrelevant in 
determining  the  price  impact  of  the  survey  announcement.  This  lack  of  announcement  impact  is  in 
contrast to Filbeck and Preece’s (2003) finding that Fortune’s survey relating to employment practices leads 
to a 4% announcement day abnormal return for the highly rated firms.  
 
In summary, we find that there is very little immediate price impact around the time when the Management 
Today rankings are announced, but this is perhaps hardly surprising. Given that the scores are supposed to 
provide an assessment of the inherent quality of a firm and of its reputation, the announcements are 
unlikely to lead to immediate price pressures. Therefore, while this result is consistent with their being no 
information content in the scores, or in relative changes to the scores, two alternative scenarios would lead 
to the same finding. First, it is equally possible that investors respond with a much longer lag to the 
Management Today data, taking the scores into account in their decision-making process when they next 
rebalance their portfolios. Second, even if investors ignore the survey data, the scores may still have useful 
information content if, when viewed ex post, the stock of admired companies yielded higher returns than 
that of less reputable firms. In order to investigate this issue further, we now turn our attention to an 
assessment of the relationship between reputation scores and stock returns over the longer-run.  
 
5.2. Long-run Performance of Most Admired Companies 
Table 4 presents the results of various trading strategies associated with transacting in most admired 
companies on 1 December each year and holding the positions until 30 November in the following year. 
The  numbers  in  parentheses  (aside  from  the  last  column)  give  the number  of stocks  that  would  be 
included in the portfolio in each case. For example, “87” below the return for the top 100 companies for a 
particular  year  indicates  that  of  the  top  100  companies,  we  have  full  data  on  87  of  them  that  are 
incorporated into the portfolio to exploit the strategy. The final column of Table 4 gives the returns 
averaged across all 9 (in some cases 8) years, followed by the annual standard deviations of returns in ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-05 
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parentheses. The FTSE All-Share returns for each year are presented in the first row for comparison. 
Aside from the very last row, all returns are given in abnormal form, that is, after subtracting the return on 
the FTSE All-Share during that year.  
 
Once the most admired companies list is produced, it is not immediately clear how one should employ 
this information to form trading rules. One might first consider simply buying and holding all of the 
companies that have been ranked, although little can be inferred about survey respondents’ attitudes 
towards a company from the fact that the company has not received a score. Such an absence implies that 
it is not among the ten largest in their sector, not necessarily that it has a poor reputation. 
 
A strategy of buying an equally weighted portfolio comprising all companies with a reputations score 
yields  an  average  annual  abnormal  return  of  around  1%.  After  allowing  for  the  difference  between 
benchmarks used in calculating the abnormal returns, this result is consistent with that of Agarwal et al. 
(2005), who employ the same survey scores as used in this study but for a slightly earlier sample period. A 
second set of strategies involves buying only the companies that appear high on a ranking of the most 
admired companies scores. Rows 4 to 6 of Table 4 give the returns from holding the top 100, top 50 and 
top 10 highest ranked companies each year respectively. Screening out companies whose scores rank 
below the top 100 is not helpful, but buying and holding the top 50 improves average annual abnormal 
returns to 3.4%.  However, reducing the number of portfolio constituents to 10 leads to average returns 
that are below those available from simply buying and holding the index. A glance at the returns for 
individual years indicates that this arises largely from a particularly bad performance during 1998-99, 
where the Index rose by 25% and the strategy returned  -10%. Such a small portfolio is likely to embody 
significant idiosyncratic risk, and in this year, the price of one of the included stocks, Boots, fell by 36%. 
Had this stock not been included, the abnormal return that year on the portfolio comprising the other 9 
stocks would be +2.8%, a performance more consistent with the other years.  
 
However, as shown above, the scores typically vary very little from one year to another, and a trading 
strategy based upon the inclusion of stocks that achieve at least a particular ranking may be sub-optimal ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-05 
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since it does not make full use of any new information. Sharper trading rules may arise from a strategy 
based on buying and holding stocks whose rankings have risen, and on selling stocks whose rankings have 
fallen. The average annual abnormal returns for portfolios of rising and falling stocks are 1.1% and 3.3% 
respectively, indicating that the “bad news” associated with a stock fall is outweighed by the fact that the 
stock is likely to be still included in the list of stocks with a score.  
 
Even if the relative ranking of stocks has shifted from one year to the next, it may have only shifted by 
one or two places. A more explicit signal is offered in situations where scores change significantly leading 
to a large change in the ranking. Therefore, rows 9 and 10 of Table 4 present the results from buying a 
portfolio of stocks whose rankings rose by at least 50 places, and from selling a portfolio of stocks whose 
rankings fell by at least 50 places respectively. The results in this case are sharper than those for simple 
rises or falls, with average annual abnormal returns of 4.38% (ignoring transactions costs for now) for 
firms whose rankings rise by more than 50 places. This average return would have translated an initial 
investment on 1 December 1995 of £1,000 into approximately £2,059 by 30 November 2003, while an 
identical  investment  in  the  FTSE  All-Share  would  have  had  a  terminal  value  of  only  £1,545.  Even 
companies whose rankings have fallen substantially still yield average returns higher than the FTSE index.  
Finally, a zero investment portfolio with returns having a low correlation with the market index (0.11) can 
be produced by taking a long position in the firms whose rankings rose substantially and a short position 
in the firms whose rankings fell substantially. The annual returns for such a portfolio, which average 3.5%, 
are given in the last row of Table 4. 
 
Nothing has been said thus far concerning the relative risks of the trading rules proposed above, nor has 
any mention been made of the associated transactions costs. The numbers in parentheses in the ultimate 
column of Table 4 give the standard deviations of the annual returns to each strategy. As can be seen, 
these figures are similar to those from buying and holding the market index, indicating that the strategy 
Sharpe ratios are likely to be larger than those of the index in all cases except the purchase of the top 10 ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-05 
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companies by score. Transactions costs for the largest UK companies that are part of the FTSE All Share 
are likely to be of the order 0.5%-2%7. 
 
Table 5 presents the annual returns8 results for various portfolios formed at announcement day and held 
for one year. As for Table 4, the ultimate column shows average returns over all years in the sample, with 
the standard deviation of annual returns in parentheses. Again, for comparison, the first row after the 
header gives returns for the FTSE All-Share. The following three rows examine the impact that having a 
reputation score has on performance. It is evident that average annual returns for companies with no 
score (23%) are more than double those having a score on 1 December (9.7%). Even more strikingly, the 
equally weighted portfolio of firms with no scores yields higher returns by at least 2.5% every single year 
that we examine. It would be too hasty, however, to conclude from this that investors were paying too 
much for companies having reputation scores, since we know from Panel A of Table 2 that companies 
with  (high)  scores  have  high  price-to-book  values,  are  large  and  performed  well  in  the  previous  12 
months. Aside from the last (momentum) characteristic, the large size and glamour traits typically lead to 
lower returns. Therefore, an idea of whether we can attribute the poor performance of firms with scores 
to their characteristics is given in the fifth row of Table 5. This row shows the return that would have 
been expected of the portfolio of firms with scores, given the average characteristics of such firms. While 
the average expected return (14.8%) is lower than the actual returns of the portfolio of firms without 
scores, it is still higher than the actual return of the portfolio of firms with scores. We thus conclude that 
even given their characteristics, firms given reputational scores underperform by an average of around 5% 
per annum. Again, there is consistent underperformance for every year in our sample period. Such a 
finding is broadly in line with that of Agarwal et al. (2005) once we allow for their use of the risk free rate 
of return as the performance benchmark rather than the FTSE All-Share return as is employed in this 
study.  
 
We  next  examine  the  profitability  of  rules  based  on  investing  equally  in  only  the  top  100  firms  by 
reputational ranking, and the results are qualitatively identical to those of firms with scores. That is, the 
                                                       
7 Plus 1% “stamp duty” – a tax on all share purchases in the UK. 
8 Note that, for ease of comparison with the various benchmarks, these are unadjusted rather than abnormal returns. ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-05 
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average annual return for top 100 firms (9.8%) is only half that of firms outside the top 100 (18.8%)9. 
Firms in the top 100 have the characteristics of firms showing poor stock market performance, but this is 
not quite sufficient to explain why they do so badly, since expected returns for such firms are 10.9% p.a.  
 
What of the firms whose ranks rose substantially – is their performance still impressive after allowing for 
their financial characteristics? An answer to this question is also provided by Table 5. Once again, actual 
annual average returns (11.1%) of firms whose ranks rose by at least 50 places are lower than those 
expected (12.4%). Thus, in summary, firms that are highly regarded by financial analysts and company 
executives in that sector, do not perform as well as they should, however we measure any information 
contained in the reputations survey. Financially, it is more profitable to purchase small value stocks with 
recent return momentum than to develop a strategy based on the information contained in the UK’s most 
admired  companies  survey.  These  findings  run  contrary  to  some  evidence  relating  to  US  companies 
(Antunovich  and  Laster,  2000;  Filbeck  and  Preece,  2003;  Chemmanur  and  Paeglis,  2005),  but  do 
somewhat echo the corresponding findings of Chung et al. (1999), Wade et al. (2006) and Malmendier and 
Tate  (2005)  that  show  a  good  corporate  reputation  to  be  a  poor  predictor  of  strong  future  share 
performance. Clearly, the size and significance or otherwise of the reputation effect depends to a large 
extent  on  the  precise  nature  of  the  methods  used  to  construct  the  reputation  scores,  and  on  the 
techniques and reference portfolios employed to detect abnormal performance.  
 
Finally, as discussed above, the companies with the very highest reputations scores are concentrated in a 
small  number  of  sectors,  notably  food  retail  and  pharmaceuticals,  so  what  effect  does  industrial 
classification have on the performance of highly rated firms? In order to answer this question, Table 5 
presents the returns for the companies in the top 100, and for companies whose rankings had risen by at 
least 50 places, that would have been expected given their industrial classifications. In other words, we 
present the returns that would have been expected had the highly regarded firms have been typical for 
their industries. These figures are obtained by finding the average return for each industry in each year and 
then  constructing  a  weighted  average  of  these  industry  returns,  where  the  weights  are  equal  to  the 
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proportion of firms in the strategy portfolio (e.g. top 100 firms by score) that are in each industry. As the 
results show, the highly regarded firms continue to underperform relative to expectations, and thus these 
firms’  stock  returns  are  lower  than  their  industrial  make-up  would  suggest.  For  example,  an  equally 
weighted portfolio comprising the top 100 firms by reputation would have yielded an average return of 
9.79%, but given the industrial classifications of these firms, a return of 15.6% would have been expected. 
Thus, investing in firms having the highest scores would historically have led to the purchase of the wrong 
stocks in the right industries. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This study has investigated the short-run price impact upon announcement of the Management Today list of 
Most Admired Firms in the UK. The announcement of the reputations scores on 1 December appears to 
be anticipated on the previous trading day, although there is very little short-term adjustment effect post-
announcement, and there are no immediate profitable trading opportunities.  
 
Interestingly, we find that around the time of the announcement on December 1st, stock prices rise even 
for firms whose reputations scores have slipped. Similarly, long-run returns on reputationally damaged 
stocks are on average slightly higher than those of the market index. At first blush, this result seems odd, 
for it seems to suggest that only no news is bad news and any news is good news. But this finding 
corroborates  the  findings  of  Barber  and  Odean  (2002),  who  show  that  even  negative  information 
concerning a particular stock will lead retail investors to increase their demand for it. Schwarzkopf (2003) 
uses an experiment to demonstrate that investors often find it hard to interpret financial information and 
will exhibit some demand for inferior stocks when information on them becomes available.  
 
Various  plausible  strategies  involving  buy-and-hold  abnormal  returns  over  the  12  months  following 
announcement are also investigated. Of these various strategies, buying the companies that rose a large 
number of ranking places appears to be the most profitable, yielding average annual abnormal returns of 
over 4%. Why do firms with strong reputations typically yield higher long-term returns than the market 
index? This superior performance occurs in spite of highly rated stocks already being large and highly ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-05 
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priced, attributes that usually degrade performance. A glance at the list of very most admired companies 
indicates that all are household names. Therefore our results are consistent with the notion that individual 
investors  like  to  hold  stocks  that  they  are  familiar  with  (Barber  and  Odean,  2002),  and  equally, 
professional  fund  managers  will  be  willing  to  heavily  weight  such  stocks  in  their  portfolios.  Fund 
managers are required to disclose their holdings in the stocks that comprise the greatest proportion of 
their portfolios. Even if the financial performance of the companies disappoints, how can clients be 
critical of managers that held such “great stocks” in their portfolios?  
 
However, when we allow for the financial characteristics of the firms (value, size, beta, momentum), the 
returns to the companies incorporated in these strategies all fall below expectations. We thus conclude 
that, when an appropriate benchmark is used, there is no trading profitability in an examination of the 
results of the UK’s most admired companies survey. The benchmarking issue is crucial, and a standard 
market index such as the FTSE All-Share is a poor choice as a yardstick since it is likely to have different 
characteristics to the typical highly rated firm. Our results are consistent with those from the study of the 
Management Today index carried out by Agarwal et al. (2005), while extending that conclusion to include 
both announcement effects on and around the publication date, and investment strategies that favour 
companies that have risen up the reputational rankings, rather than the most admired per se. They are also 
consistent with the findings for the US-based Fortune index of Chung et al. (1998), although, while also 
employing the Fortune index, Antunovich and Laster (2000) found positive abnormal returns of over 3%. 
The difference in results may be attributable to the fact that the latter accounted for firm size and a 
measure of value, but not momentum or industry, when calculating out-performance. Our results are of 
importance for fund managers and stock analysts, for they suggest that a firm’s reputation is not a useful 
measure in determining whether buying its stock is likely to be profitable, even if one favours companies 
whose reputational rating has risen considerably since last it was reported. 
 
Why do firms with strong reputations provide lower returns than expected given their characteristics? 
Even though highly admired firms usually are large “growth” firms, they also typically have share price 
momentum, an attribute that dominates others and leads to an expectation that such firms will still yield ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-05 
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high returns over the following year. Risk factor-based models of the Fama-French variety have been 
unable to provide the answer, and so one may look to behavioural explanations. There is evidence that 
investors, and in particular individuals, make stock purchase decisions in the same was as they would make 
choices  between  consumer  durables,  relying  on  a  well-known  brand  as  a  proxy  for  quality.  If  the 
perception of quality is illusory from a financial point of view, eventually enthusiasm for the stocks of 
reputationally highly rated firms will disappear and there will be a price reversal.  
 
Antunovich  and  Laster  (2000)  find  evidence  of  seasonality  in  the  relationship  between  stock  price 
performance and reputation scores. They argue that this arises as a result of fund managers engaging in 
“window dressing” – that is, they have a tendency to purchase highly rated stocks towards the end of their 
financial year when stock holdings are reported, typically in December. It would be of interest to conduct 
a similar analysis in the context of our UK data, although a timing difficulty arises since the Management 
Today survey results are published in December, while those of Fortune appear in March. Therefore, in the 
UK case, it would be difficult to separate announcement effects from seasonal patterns, and we leave this 
question to future research. 
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Table 1: Top Five Highest Scoring Firms for each year 1994-2003 
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Table 2: Determinants of Most Admired Company Scores 
Panel A: Score Regression Results 
scorei,t = α0 + α1PTBVi,t-1 + α2BETAi,t-1 + α3CAPi,t-1 + α4 RETi, t-1 + ut 













Panel B: Average Scores by Industrial Sector 
Financials  53.98  Utilities  53.57 
Unquoted Equities  47.80  Resources  55.04 
IT  55.57  Cyclical Consumer  52.72 
Cyclical Services  54.00  General Industrials  55.58 
Basic Industries  53.96  Non-Cyclical Services  55.86 
Non-Cyclical Consumer  56.18     
Notes: ** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 3: Returns Around Announcement Day for Companies whose Ranks have Risen 
 
Day  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  Average 
t-10  -0.042  -0.055  -0.349**  -0.149  -0.031  0.109  -0.099  -0.101  0.010  -0.079 
t-9  -0.177**  -0.104  0.035  -0.118  0.002  0.063  -0.067  0.050  -0.196**  -0.057 
t-8  -0.074  0.035  -0.006  -0.497**  0.355**  -0.199  -0.297**  0.296  0.046  -0.038 
t-7  -0.017  0.058  -0.180  -0.186  0.088  0.006  -0.109  -0.180  -0.056  -0.064 
t-6  0.151**  -0.193**  -0.305**  -0.240*  0.186  -0.232  0.067  0.323  -0.127**  -0.041 
t-5  0.036  -0.142**  0.513**  0.338**  -0.245  -0.135  0.267*  0.076  -0.161**  0.061 
t-4  -0.126  -0.009  -0.027  0.230**  -0.438*  0.157  0.000  -0.101  -0.004  -0.035 
t-3  -0.055  0.035  -0.032  -0.273  0.221  0.320  -0.008  -0.136  0.098  0.019 
t-2  0.081  0.061  0.004  -0.228**  0.198  -0.094  -0.201  0.082  0.023  -0.008 
t-1  -0.069  -0.052  0.238**  0.301**  0.428  0.100  0.325**  0.216  0.129**  0.180** 
t  -0.069  0.099*  -0.302**  0.357**  -0.065  0.140  0.054  -0.189  -0.240**  -0.024 
t+1  -0.036  -0.069*  -0.150**  0.024  -0.019  -0.061  -0.214*  -0.024  0.220**  -0.037 
t+2  0.046  0.004  0.064  -0.181  -0.038  -0.056  -0.118  0.255  -0.027  -0.006 
t+3  -0.027  0.023  -0.297**  -0.147  -0.410*  0.270  0.115  -0.031  0.013  -0.055 
t+4  0.112*  0.051  -0.278**  -0.185  0.035  -0.022  0.381**  -0.150  -0.027  -0.009 
t+5  -0.065  -0.046  -0.252**  -0.236**  -0.076  -0.005  0.196  0.251  -0.004  -0.026 
t+6  -0.090  -0.106  0.059  -0.086  -0.498  -0.219  -0.016  -0.034  -0.159**  -0.128** 
t+7  -0.089  0.167**  0.001  0.029  -0.098*  -0.255  -0.050  -0.349  0.077  -0.063 
t+8  0.044  0.045  0.251**  0.337**  0.246  0.000  0.042  -0.384  -0.060  0.058 
t+9  0.067  0.093  0.003  -0.099  -0.324  0.134  -0.119  0.318  -0.112  -0.004 
t+10  0.197*  -0.018  -0.218**  -0.023  0.149  0.080  0.000  -0.329**  -0.033  -0.022 
t-10, t-1  -0.293  -0.367*  -0.108  -0.822*  0.764  0.094  -0.121  0.525  -0.237  -0.063 
t, t+10  0.090  0.243  -1.120**  -0.209  -1.098  0.007  0.271  -0.667  -0.352  -0.315* ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-05 
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Table 4: One-Year Returns following Announcements for Various Portfolios 
Strategy  1994-95  1995-96  1996-97  1997-98  1998-99  1999-00  2000-01  2001-02  2002-03  Av. (std. dev.) - 
All Years 
FTSE All-Share  24.83  15.38  21.24  12.45  25.06  -2.58  -13.44  -17.58  13.00  8.71 
(16.09) 


















































































Abnormal Return Companies whose 
ranks have risen 


















Abnormal Return Companies whose 
ranks have fallen 


















Abnormal Return Companies whose 
ranks have risen by at  
least 50 places 


















Abnormal Return Companies whose 
ranks have fallen by at  
least 50 places 



















Return for strategy: Buy firms with big 
rank rises and short sell firms with big 
rank falls 
-  -3.86  -3.88  14.58  -4.45  12.32  25.17  -32.91  21.34  3.54 
(18.85) 
Notes:  All portfolios are assumed to be formed on 1 December when the reputations scores are announced, and are held until 30 November of the following year, so, for example, 
the 1994-95 return is for the period 1 December 1994 – 30 November 1995. Abnormal returns in each case are equal to actual returns minus return on the FTSE All-Share over the 
same period. The entries in the last column refer to the average returns for all years with standard deviations (standard deviations calculated using raw rather than abnormal returns) 
in parentheses * and ** denote mean returns that are significantly different from zero at the 5% and 1% levels respectively in a two-tailed t-test.  ICMA Discussion Papers in Finance 2006-05 
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Table 5 One-Year Returns for Various Portfolios 
Strategy  1994-95  1995-96  1996-97  1997-98  1998-99  1999-00  2000-01  2001-02  2002-03  Av. (std. dev.) - 
All Years 
FTSE All-Share  24.83  15.38  21.24  12.45  25.06  -2.58  -13.44  -17.58  13.00  8.71 
(16.09) 
Return for companies with 
no reputations score 
35.48  38.58  21.73  13.83  51.25  11.91  8.68  -10.54  36.05  23.00 
(19.06) 






















Expected return for companies with a score 





















Returns for companies outside 
top 100 
27.73  28.33  14.82  7.66  47.29  12.22  8.29  -11.91  34.49  18.77 
(17.55) 




















Expected return for companies in top 100 





















Expected return for companies in top 100 
given their industry classification 
22.22  24.06  16.38  9.61  32.90  12.15  4.43  -8.59  27.27  15.60 
(12.79) 
Return for companies whose ranks  





















Expected return for companies whose ranks 





















Expected return for companies whose ranks 
rose > 50 places given their industry 
-  30.46  11.76  25.43  42.44  6.58  1.77  -14.27  32.17  17.04 
(18.80) 
Notes:  All portfolios are assumed to be formed on 1 December when the reputations scores are announced, and are held until 1 December of the following year, so, for example, 
the 1994-95 return is for the period 1 December 1994 – 1 December 1995. The entries in the last column refer to the average returns for all years with standard deviations in 
parentheses. ICMA Discussion Papers In Finance 2006-04 
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